Tag: Judgment Enforcement

A Final General Sessions Judgment Can Be Enforced in Other States as a Foreign Judgment

When it’s an option, I always encourage clients to file lawsuits in Tennessee’s General Sessions Courts. Justice moves fast, efficiently, and cheap. The lawsuit you file today could be set for hearing next week; executions on the judgment could go out by the end of the month. Zip zap.

Nevertheless, lawyers often express uncertainty about whether a judgment from General Sessions Court–not a “court of record”–is enforceable in another state under under that state’s version of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA).

I think they are. Here’s why.

If your General Sessions judgment is final and enforceable in Tennessee, why can’t you take to another state? “Foreign judgment” means “any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-103.

In layman terms, it’s a judgment from another U.S. state court. Based on that, a Tennessee General Sessions judgment qualifies so long as the rendering court had jurisdiction and the judgment is valid and final, right?

“Final” in General Sessions Court is determined under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108, which says generally that any judgment that isn’t appealed within ten days. If you can garnish a bank account and wages on the judgment, why can’t you take it to another state?

So, yes, maybe small claims court has a more “vibrant” cast of characters than your typical courtroom, but that doesn’t mean the judgements granted there have any less legal impact.

Law Firms: To avoid Malpractice Claims, Remember that Tennessee Judgments Expire in Ten Years

Tennessee judgments expire after ten years.

As a creditor lawyer, one of my greatest fears is that one of the many judgments that I’ve taken over the past 10 years is set to expire and I have forgotten about it.

It is so easy to renew judgments under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 69.04, but it’s also easy to forget about those old files. If a law firm forgets, it could get sued for malpractice. It’s a big deal.

Earlier this week, the Tennessee Court of Appeals touched on this issue. See John Doe Corp. v. Kennerly, Montgomery & Finley, P.C., E2023-00236-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2024).

In the case, after the 10 year period expired on an old judgment, the judgment creditor client sued its former lawyers, alleging that the law firm “had failed to inform Plaintiff that the judgment would expire after ten years or that it needed to seek to extend the judgment prior to its expiration.”

The trial court dismissed the claims against the law firm, because the client failed to have filed the lawsuit within the one-year attorney malpractice statute of limitations. The opinion doesn’t really focus on the renewal issue; the real analysis is on issues of recusal and the different standards under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 and 60.02.

But, back to creditor rights. Is this is victory for the law firm? Not really, because lawyers don’t like being sued for malpractice in the first place.

Since starting my firm nearly 4 years ago, I’ve opened 639 new cases. Before that, I handled a similarly busy caseload at my old firm. In the past 10 years, I’ve taken 100s of judgments.

It would be a cold comfort to me to know that, if my client sues me for malpractice, I could possibly defend the case on a technicality.

Having said that, how can lawyers mitigate that risk? The answer is in a Court of Appeals decision I wrote about in 2019. There, the malpractice claims turned on whether the law firm warned the client, at any point, that the judgment needed to be renewed in ten years. Because the law firm had previously warned the client about the 10 year expiration, the client had knowledge of the possible malpractice claims that accrued at the time of non-renewal (and not a later date).

Look at the text of the John Doe case: the client alleged that the law firm “had failed to inform Plaintiff that the judgment would expire after ten years or that it needed to seek to extend the judgment prior to its expiration.”

If you’re like me, a busy lawyer with many judgments, remember my advice from 2019: “A good practice is to make sure that the client understands that it has a responsibility in ten years to notify you that it wants you to take this action.”

In a perfect world, my advice is to calendar judgments and simply avoid this issue altogether.

A separate safeguard could be, in that initial congratulatory email, sending a copy of the judgment to the client, to always include text that clearly discusses the validity and expiration of the Judgment in terms that the client can understand.

The race is on: Davidson County Chancery answers a long-standing question regarding judgment liens

We’re one step closer to answering one of Tennessee collection law’s greatest mysteries: Can a judgment creditor record a copy of its judgment as soon as it is signed by the Judge, or must the creditor wait 30 days?

The question arises under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 62.01, which says that “…no execution shall issue upon a judgment, nor shall proceedings be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of 30 days after its entry…”

The exact issue is this: Is recording a certified copy of a judgment an “execution”? I’ve been asked that for years, but never quite knew the answer.

For starters, what’s the statutory authority for recording a judgment lien? I look at Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69, which is titled “Execution on Judgments,” and includes all the different ways you can “execute” on judgments (garnishments, levies, sheriff’s sales, liens). This list includes Tenn. R. Civ. P. 69.07(2), “Execution on Realty,” which provides the exact process to record a judgment lien against the judgment debtor’s realty.

And let’s be honest; why would you record a judgment in the first place? Under Tennessee law, the recording of a judgment with the register’s office creates a lien on real property, meaning that the debtor can’t sell, refinance, or transfer the property without dealing with the judgment. It’s a pretty powerful tool to get paid. That’s why you’d record it, and as fast as possible.

If the point is to get paid–and as soon as possible–that looks a lot like enforcement, right? But is that “execution”? Should we also throw around terms like “collection” or “attachment” too?

It’s been a mess because the statutes and rules all seem to use these different terms interchangeably, except when they aren’t interchangeable.

Faced with this exact issue, the Davidson County Chancery Court had to make sense of these competing terms and concepts. In an Order from February 2, 2024, the Court found the mere act of recording a judgment during the Rule 62.01 stay period “was not premature ….because the filing of judgment lien is not an act of enforcement.”

In doing so, the Court referenced the pleadings filed in the matter, which drew reasoning from Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-5-101(b)(1) and the competing concepts of “final” judgments found in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54 and 62.01. Further, given the Court’s brief, but specific, factual finding, the Court seems to agree with the opposing brief’s distinction between the acts of recording a lien versus enforcing a lien, arguing that only the latter would violate Rule 62.01. The full Order is attached below.

2024-02-02-order-on-motion-to-void-lienDownload

It’s an important issue that has long vexed creditor rights lawyers, debtor’s counsel, and even court clerks. I’ve had court clerks only begrudgingly provide me with a certified copy of a judgment on the day of entry (and reminding me that I “can’t do anything with it for 30 days”).

This Order and the related reasoning may provide a roadmap for future arguments on this issue, which comes up far more frequently than you’d think.

I watched these trial court proceedings pretty closely, and I’m glad to see a creditor-friendly result. The underlying initial pleadings are also attached below.

2024-02-02-original-motion-to-void-lienDownload
2024-02-02-response-in-opposition-to-motion-to-void-lienDownload

Plaintiffs Counsel Beware: Tenn. Court of Appeals issues new opinion on “finality” of general sessions judgments

If you’ve ever filed a lawsuit involving multiple claims or multiple parties, you probably already know how Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 works. If you don’t, here’s a primer that I wrote in 2017.

Yesterday, the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued a new opinion on this topic, which is a must read for sessions lawyers.

The case, Mary Bradley v. Catherine A. Pesce, W2023-00583-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. Ap. Dec. 19, 2023)(full copy here), involves a lawsuit against two defendants, filed in general sessions court in 2020. Plaintiff served one defendant, but never got the other served. After taking a judgment in June 2022 against the served defendant, plaintiff nonsuited the claims against the never-served defendant in January 2023.

Using the date of the dismissal, the judgment defendant filed an appeal of the June 2022 judgment. The issue, of course, was whether her appeal was timely under Tenn. Code. Ann. § 27-5-108, which provides “[a]ny party may appeal from a decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court of the county within a period of ten (10) days.”

Wasn’t the defendant required to appeal within 10 days of the June 2022 judgment?

Looking to Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a), the Court of Appeals first asked whether a ruling in a matter is “final” where other claims (like a cross-claim) are still pending. The Court noted that the “finality rule” is applicable even in general sessions cases, citing other opinions that “the time for filing a notice of appeal [does] not begin to run until every claim raised in the general sessions court [is] adjudicated.” Further, the Court considered the 2018 amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108, which provide that one party’s timely appeal takes all issues to the circuit court, even when other claims remain pending.

In the end, the Court concluded that because “the general sessions court action …was against two parties: Appellant and Ms. Weaver,” then “[t]he judgment against Appellant was not final and appealable until all the claims of all the parties were adjudicated,” and “[t]his occurred on or about January
5, 2023.” As a result, the appeal of the June 2022 ruling was not a final order until the dismissal order was signed.

In short, the concepts behind Rule 54.02 apply in Tennessee General Sessions Court, and litigants should keep this opinion in their mind any time a case involves multiple claims and parties.

Here, it seems like the judgment debtor acted out of necessity (and not by design). Frankly, the safest course of action would have been to file the appeal in June 2022 and be entirely certain that the appeal was timely (which would have, by operation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108, taken the entire matter to circuit court).

On the other side of the aisle, an experienced plaintiff’s lawyer knows the incredible challenges that an evading or difficult-to-serve defendant presents, and that lawyer should take precaution to make any partial judgment final (and executable) as soon as possible.

This could be done in a few easy ways. The plaintiff could ask for text in the sessions judgment that tracks the language of Rule 54.02, making it clear that the order is a final order. The plaintiff could, at the time of the entry of the initial judgment, dismiss the other claims and parties. Or, if the other claims and parties were simply too crucial, the plaintiff could delay all relief or, at worst, live with a bit of ambiguity as to the finality of the partial judgment.

The appellate court’s reasoning is sound, but a savvy plaintiff has a number of ways to protect their client.

A more pressing question is this: If the “partial” sessions judgment isn’t final in a situation like this, then shouldn’t the Court Clerk refuse to issue execution? (Spoiler: Most will issue execution, but, based on this case, they shouldn’t.)

Tennessee Court of Appeals questions “reasonableness” of contingency fees in collection judgment

Many collections lawyers handle cases on a contingency basis. They don’t bill by the hour, but, instead, they keep some percentage (usually 33%) of the money they actually collect for the clients. Sounds fair, right?

A recent study showed that a Nashville lawyer’s average rate exceeds $500 per hour, and that adds up pretty quick. With lawyers being so expensive, it makes sense that some clients would ask their attorney to share in the success (or, maybe, frustration) of the collection process.

(As a quick disclaimer, I rarely take collections cases on a contingency and, when I do, I’ve done my advance homework and am confident that, candidly, we’re all going to make a lot of money.)

Because the contingency fee attorney is not sending bills that track every minute of his time, a down-side is that he may not have a clear measure of how much in fees he has expended on a case. This is important in breach of contract cases, when the lawyer asks the judge to add an award of attorney fees to the creditor’s judgment. Under Tennessee law, a trial court must consider whether the fees requested are “reasonable,” using very specific guidelines established by the Tennessee Supreme Court.

If the lawyer hasn’t kept track of her work, then what amount does the attorney ask for? Generally, contingency-fee lawyers simply ask for their contingency-fee amount to be added to the judgment. That is generally allowed.

Not so fast, a September 2023 Tennessee Court of Appeals opinion says.

In that case, after they were awarded $50,000 on their breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs asked for attorney’s fees “in the amount of one-third of the total Judgment, or sixteen thousand six hundred and sixty-six dollars and sixty-six cents ($16,666.66).” See Fulmer v. SARCO, GP, No. M202201479COAR3CV, 2023 WL 5787082, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2023).

In questioning the attorney fees, the Court of Appeals wrote that “[w]hile a one-third fee may have been what [plaintiffs] agreed to pay their counsel, it is not what [defendants] agreed to pay in the Note” (which only referenced “reasonable attorney fees”). Id. The defendants were not party to the contingency fee agreement, and “what [plaintiffs] agreed to pay their own attorney is not dispositive of what constitutes a reasonable fee under the circumstances of this case.” Id.

Instead, the trial court must have some proof substantiating the fees and services provided, consistent with the factors listed in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 1.5. Id.

I understand the reasoning here, but I disagree with the general premise that a contingency fee is, per se, not reasonable.

As an example, consider my practice. If I accept one of my no-brainer, “we’re all going to make a lot of money” contingency fee cases mentioned above (and my homework is correct), I could possibly make a $333,333.33 fee on a lawsuit that lasts two months. Does that the fact that I got the matter resolved quickly and efficiently necessarily mean that my fee violates the Tennessee standards for reasonableness? This opinion suggests it might.

In my limited contingency practice, I lean really heavily on my skills, expertise, and homework (i.e. the “novelty and difficulty” referenced in the Rule) in picking my cases. In short, on those cases where I hit a grand slam, it can occasionally look easy, but a lot goes into that. It’s like the ship repairman, who charged $2.00 for tapping the engine with a hammer one time and $9,998.00 for knowing where to tap. He is worth every penny.

In the end, the Court of Appeals remanded the question back to the trial court, and there’s some chance that the plaintiffs make these same arguments in defense of their contingency fee.

Tennessee’s Post-Judgment Interest Rate Hits Record High

Effective July 1, 2023, the statutory rate of post-judgment interest in Tennessee is 10.25%, the highest that it’s been in my 20 plus years of practice.

Long-time readers know that, in 2012, the Tennessee Legislature amended the Tennessee post-judgment interest statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121.

At the time, Tennessee creditor rights attorneys complained both about the decrease in the interest rate (at the time, it dropped from 10% to 5.25%) and also the confusion related to tracking a variable rate (it changes every 6 months). Back then, none of us envisioned a world where the rate would exceed Tennessee’s old rate.

Well, welcome to the future.

What’s next? A review of the historical list of Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121 interest rates shows that rates have been steadily climbing since 2016, with the greatest spike in the past year.

When the Legislature made these changes during the Great Recession, it was designed to provide relief to judgment debtors. That the rate has reached an all-time high is good for creditors, of course, but also indicative that interest rates are pushing the economy toward a tipping point.

Welcome to the Future: Starting on July 1, Rule 5.02 allows service of pleadings by e-mail.

Effective July 1, 2023, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5.02(2)(a) will be modernized, so that lawyers can serve pleadings by e-mail.

I wrote about the proposed changes last year, and, in response, a number of you pointed out that Rule 5.02 already allowed service by e-mail.

Sure, you could, but the current version created a process that was three times more complicated than just printing it and mailing the pleading. Long story short, the existing Rule 5.02 wasn’t quite as simple as “service by email is allowed.”

The new Rule 5.02(a) makes it that simple: “Service on any attorney or on a party may also be made by emailing the person the document in Adobe PDF to the recipient’s email address, which shall be promptly furnished on request. The sender shall include language in the subject line designed to alert the recipient that a document is being served under this rule.”

civ_pro_amendments_approved_041423Download

Old habits are hard to break, and there’s not much that lawyers love more than old habits. To that end, all you non-e-mailers will be happy to know that Rule 5.02 still provides three acceptable means of service of process, with service by mail remaining an option. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5.02(1).

I tend to assume that lawyers who send me pleadings the mail are either being sneaky (why not waste 3 days or so of the other party’s review and response time) or trying to avoid confrontation (worrying that an emailed pleading will open the door to a snarky response).

Not me. I’ll be saving some trees and sending e-mails.

As a matter of practice, I plan to continue to send full copies of pleadings via US Mail to pro se parties, even though the rule conspicuously doesn’t require different service for pro se parties.

It’s a smart amendment, which reflects how lawyers practice law in 2023.

New Tennessee Court of Appeals Resolves Ten-Year Old Question about Post-Judgment Interest Rate

For nearly a decade, I’ve been writing about the Tennessee post-judgment interest statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121, which was amended in 2012 to change from the long-standing fixed rate of 10% to a variable rate that changes every 6 months.

I say “writing,” but others may say “complaining.” They’d probably cite this post: What I Don’t Like About the New Post-Judgment Interest Rate Statute In Tennessee (Everything).

My initial concern was one that many Tennessee lawyers shared: Because the interest rate is subject to change every six months, will the applicable rate on an existing judgment also change every six months?

Nobody knew. Not attorneys. Not court clerks. Not even the trial court judges.

In a very helpful comment to this 2020 post about the issue, Tennessee attorney Michelle Reynolds provided the best answer I’d seen (and one that I’ve since argued):

From the TNCourts.gov website: “Beginning July 1, 2012, any judgment entered will have the interest set at two percent below the formula rate published by the Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions as set in Public Chapter 1043. The rate does not fluctuate and remains in effect when judgment is entered.”

Of course, that’s not a case or a statute. It’s an “introductory paragraph on the Administrative Office of the Courts website.”

In an opinion issued last night, however, we have our answer!

In the case (Laura Coffey v. David L. Coffey, No. E2021-00433-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2022), the Tennessee Court of Appeals notes this long-standing confusion and then immediately dispels it.

In its analysis, the Court notes that the rate to be applied under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121(a) is clear and unambiguous (it’s math), and it’s the entirely separate provision at Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121(b) that introduces fluctuations in the general rate. Noting the clarity in (a), the Court finds that (b) does not create ambiguity as to existing judgments.

Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121(a), the Court writes, the “applicable post-judgment interest rate does not fluctuate when applied to a particular judgment; instead, it remains the same for the entire period of time following entry of the judgment…until the judgment is paid.”

It’s always a great day when an unresolved issue gets clarity. Sometimes I make a joke that only “law nerds” will appreciate a legal development like this; for this one, though, I think all Tennessee lawyers will benefit from this opinion.

Tennessee Judgments Always Incur Post-Judgment Interest

A good rule of thumb for prevailing parties in litigation is this: If you want something, be sure to include that in the court order.

Well, duh. The Judge can’t give it to you if it’s not expressly written in the order.

A recent opinion from the Tennessee Court of Appeals (Hartigan v. Brush, No. E202001442COAR3CV, 2021 WL 4983075 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2021)), however, makes clear that post-judgment interest applies on all monetary judgments in Tennessee, no matter if the order expressly says so.

There, the Court noted that, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-122, “Interest shall be computed on every judgment…,” and, as a result, post-judgment interest is “mandatory.”

It’s an issue that’s unlikely to come up often, partially because every prevailing party generally includes an express grant in their judgment. But, when the order doesn’t expressly say it, have this recent case ready to go.

Increase in Tennessee Homestead Exemption Fails. For Now.

Last month, the hot topic in the Tennessee creditor rights lawyer world was the rumored increase in the Tennessee homestead exemption.

Well, “rumor” is an understatement. This proposed change had real momentum and had a very strong chance of happening.

As you’d expect, this proposed change completely freaked out the creditor lawyers. I’m on the Tennessee Bar Association’s Creditor’s Practice Executive Committee, and here’s an excerpt of an email I received about it all:

This bill is bizarre. The exemption would go from the current $5,000.00-$25,000.00 to $150,000.00-$750,000.00 – a 3,000% increase!

This proposal should be officially opposed by the TBA. It would have a huge impact on banks’ and businesses’ ability to be repaid their just debts and judgments. Judgment debtors could hide any monetary assets they have in real estate and avoid having to repay what they promised to pay. This bill would legislatively tell debtors they do not have to repay their debts.

This sounds like something which Elizabeth Warren and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez might suggest.

This is not a close call. This bill is off the charts bad.

So, yes, the creditor response was pretty clear, and a quick coalition formed involving the Tennessee Banker’s Association, the Tennessee Bar Association, and a handful of other similar groups.

In the end, the House Judiciary Committee deferred the homestead bill until next year. The bill will be moved to the committee’s first calendar of next year. When it comes up then, it will be in the form considered by the Committee in its last consideration, which was in the “flat” amount of $35,000. 

Ultimately, this seems like a fair amendment. Tennessee is pretty squarely in the bottom, with one of the lowest homestead exemptions in the nation.

When it comes up, I hope the sponsors propose an increase that reflects an adjustment for inflation, and not some drastic increase designed to make Tennessee a haven for asset protection. The fatal flaw in this proposed change during this session was that there was no justification or supporting data for an increase to $750,000 or a million dollars, especially when exemptions are designed to provide a “fresh start” to broke judgment debtors. It all seemed arbitrary.

Oh well, stay tuned, and I’ll report back in 2020.