Category: Invoice Collection

Tennessee Court of Appeals questions “reasonableness” of contingency fees in collection judgment

Many collections lawyers handle cases on a contingency basis. They don’t bill by the hour, but, instead, they keep some percentage (usually 33%) of the money they actually collect for the clients. Sounds fair, right?

A recent study showed that a Nashville lawyer’s average rate exceeds $500 per hour, and that adds up pretty quick. With lawyers being so expensive, it makes sense that some clients would ask their attorney to share in the success (or, maybe, frustration) of the collection process.

(As a quick disclaimer, I rarely take collections cases on a contingency and, when I do, I’ve done my advance homework and am confident that, candidly, we’re all going to make a lot of money.)

Because the contingency fee attorney is not sending bills that track every minute of his time, a down-side is that he may not have a clear measure of how much in fees he has expended on a case. This is important in breach of contract cases, when the lawyer asks the judge to add an award of attorney fees to the creditor’s judgment. Under Tennessee law, a trial court must consider whether the fees requested are “reasonable,” using very specific guidelines established by the Tennessee Supreme Court.

If the lawyer hasn’t kept track of her work, then what amount does the attorney ask for? Generally, contingency-fee lawyers simply ask for their contingency-fee amount to be added to the judgment. That is generally allowed.

Not so fast, a September 2023 Tennessee Court of Appeals opinion says.

In that case, after they were awarded $50,000 on their breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs asked for attorney’s fees “in the amount of one-third of the total Judgment, or sixteen thousand six hundred and sixty-six dollars and sixty-six cents ($16,666.66).” See Fulmer v. SARCO, GP, No. M202201479COAR3CV, 2023 WL 5787082, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2023).

In questioning the attorney fees, the Court of Appeals wrote that “[w]hile a one-third fee may have been what [plaintiffs] agreed to pay their counsel, it is not what [defendants] agreed to pay in the Note” (which only referenced “reasonable attorney fees”). Id. The defendants were not party to the contingency fee agreement, and “what [plaintiffs] agreed to pay their own attorney is not dispositive of what constitutes a reasonable fee under the circumstances of this case.” Id.

Instead, the trial court must have some proof substantiating the fees and services provided, consistent with the factors listed in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 1.5. Id.

I understand the reasoning here, but I disagree with the general premise that a contingency fee is, per se, not reasonable.

As an example, consider my practice. If I accept one of my no-brainer, “we’re all going to make a lot of money” contingency fee cases mentioned above (and my homework is correct), I could possibly make a $333,333.33 fee on a lawsuit that lasts two months. Does that the fact that I got the matter resolved quickly and efficiently necessarily mean that my fee violates the Tennessee standards for reasonableness? This opinion suggests it might.

In my limited contingency practice, I lean really heavily on my skills, expertise, and homework (i.e. the “novelty and difficulty” referenced in the Rule) in picking my cases. In short, on those cases where I hit a grand slam, it can occasionally look easy, but a lot goes into that. It’s like the ship repairman, who charged $2.00 for tapping the engine with a hammer one time and $9,998.00 for knowing where to tap. He is worth every penny.

In the end, the Court of Appeals remanded the question back to the trial court, and there’s some chance that the plaintiffs make these same arguments in defense of their contingency fee.

Court of Appeals: If attorney discounts their fees, prevailing party may not be entitled to recover full amount

Much to my former law partners and book-keepers’ chagrin, I often apply courtesy discounts to my clients’ legal invoices.

It’s counter-productive to my business model. But, as a kid raised by a mom who worked at the local Piggly Wiggly and a dad who worked on an assembly line, sometimes I look at a bill, am reminded of how expensive lawyers are, and apply a small discount.

Don’t get me wrong: All my billable entries are wonderful and worth every penny. In fact, I tend to win many of my cases, including an award of attorney fees, and, when I do, I sometimes wonder whether the defendant have to pay the full amount (and not the discounted amount)?

A recent Tennessee Court of Appeals says that a court can only award what the prevailing party actually pays (or is obligated to pay). It’s at St. Paul Cmty. Ltd. P’ship v. St. Paul Cmty. Church, No. M202101548COAR3CV, 2023 WL 1860692(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2023).

In the case, the trial court originally awarded the Church $343,535.07 in attorney fees and expenses, which were computed at the rate of $295.00 per hour. In later proceedings (after an earlier remand), the Church attorneys asked for $515,655 in attorney fees, which appeared to retroactively calculate all entries at $450 per hour.

Why? The attorney and client had a unique “side” agreement to the engagement letter, that, even though the hourly rate was $295, if they won, the attorney would ask the Court to reimburse the fees “at a higher rate than the $295/hour I’m billing the church.” There was no agreement that the Church would ever actually have to pay that higher rate.

In light of the Tennessee’s application of the “American Rule” on attorney fees, the Court of Appeals focused on the text of the underlying agreement, which required the reimbursement of attorneys fees “incurred” by the Church. “Incur,” the Court noted, means “to become liable for” or “to be legally obligated to pay.”

Here, the lawyer’s engagement letter clearly said that the Church would never be expected to actually pay that higher rate. The trial court, then, was correct in awarding the attorney fees at the $295 rate, “which were charged and paid at the $295 rate pursuant to the written engagement letter” and denying any requests that the higher rate. Id. *6.

It’s an interesting opinion, with some fairly unique facts that would never come up in most cases.

But, in the context of long-standing litigation, a few $300 or $500 “courtesy discounts” here and there over the course of a case could add up to a few thousand (or more) dollars. After a long fought legal battle, it’d be natural to have your billing software show your cumulative legal fees for your Affidavit (which would naturally output only logged time entries and not paid bills) and forget to give your adversary the benefit of those discounts.

Under this new opinion, you may be legally obliged to. So, maybe my book-keeper is right.

Moving Targets: Determining the Date of Default in a Breach of Contract case isn’t as easy as you’d think

The court cases where attorneys sue clients for unpaid legal fees always get my attention.

As an attorney who bills clients for my work and expects every client to pay every penny, I’m generally curious about what went wrong.

There are unhappy clients. Unhappy attorneys. Bills that are too high, or too late, or for work that made the client unhappy. When attorney-client relationships go bad, there’s always a lesson to be learned.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued an opinion yesterday that has a dozen of these lessons, at Luna Law Group, PLLC v. Richardson M. Roberts, M2021-00699-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2022).

I won’t cover them all, but I will discuss one creditor’s rights high-point: When does a breach of contract occur?

Per this opinion, the six-year statute of limitations at Tenn. Code Ann. 28-3-109(a)(3) is calculated from the “termination of the attorney-client relationship,” and not from the date of the unpaid individual invoices.

The Court wrote that contracts can be “severable” or “entire,” with the relevant statute of limitation depending on the nature of the contract. Since the work at issue related to the same general engagement and the attorney’s work “would be continuously rendered over a period of time,” then, the attorney’s work was “entire.” As a result, “the statute of limitations begins to run only on the completion of such legal services” (or upon termination of the attorney’s work).

Here, the attorney filed the lawsuit (barely) within 6 years from the termination, but only after $136,283 in unpaid invoices had accumulated in the preceding 10 months (with many or most of those invoices coming due and unpaid longer than 6 years prior).

Honestly, I’d have thought that the statute would have run on some of those early invoices, but that the creditor would have had valid claims on the invoices that had gone into default within 6 years. Under this case, I would have been wrong.

Breaches, defaults, and calculating the statute of limitations isn’t as easy as you’d think. Remember this 2019 post about a debtor who didn’t make a payment for 8.5 years, but the Court found that each installment missed was an independent cause of action, resulting in a new, later statute of limitations for each new installment? I was also wrong about that one, because (as I wrote back then) “you’d think a six year old, long defaulted debt would have expired, well, six years from the default.”

To refresh your memory, debtor entered into a mortgage (final maturity date: February 1, 2021), and defaulted in 2008, but bank waited until 2016 to declare default and until 2017 to file the lawsuit.

Using the reasoning of this new case, could the Bank simply have argued that: (i) the 15 year mortgage is one, continuous debt; (ii) thus, the individual installment payments are payments on that debt and not severable obligations; (iii) and, as a result, the real statute of limitations on the failure to pay the 2008 installment payments didn’t start to run until the final maturity date on February 1, 2021?

The answer is, most likely, that the attorney’s future performance of services is indefinite and any invoices are merely progress billings toward that larger “entire” engagement, which is unlike a bank debt, which has definite and exact terms for the repayment. Having said that, though, a smart lawyer will have ample case citations to argue either direction.

In the end, I have two take-aways: (a) determining the date of breach is harder than you’d think; and (b) when in doubt, file your lawsuit sooner, rather than later.

Bankers: Are your Judgments expiring?

Tennessee judgments expire after ten years.

All those judgments you took during the Great Recession are coming up for renewal. If you don’t affirmatively ask the court for an extension, they just go away.

And, all those builders, contractors, investors, and so many others who were broke in 2010/2011 but who turned things around when Nashville real estate, business, and construction boomed in 2015 (and beyond)?

They’ve been waiting. Hoping that you’d forget about them. Hoping that you’d do nothing to renew your judgment.

Part of what makes this Creditors Rights blog so popular is that I keep it an objective discussion of the law. You don’t see me use it to solicit business. (Well, overtly.)

But, for today, I’ll say this: If you have a box of judgments that you haven’t touched for years…Call or e-mail me immediately. There may still be time.

I’m seeing it happen every day. Big judgments are expiring, and debtors are ridding themselves of millions dollars’ worth of judgment liens.

Once upon a time, the creditor probably got frustrated by the dead-ends (or maybe the expensive lawyers spinning their wheels while billing by the hour). Those old files got put in a file cabinet. Maybe the banker switched banks. Maybe the bank got sold.

But, if you don’t dust off those old files, you are probably leaving money on the table. If you haven’t looked at those old files lately, it may be too late.

Tennessee courts will not save a party from its own contract: Liquidated Damages provisions will usually be upheld

When a tenant under a long term lease defaults, you’ll remember that the landlord can’t automatically sue for the entire balance due over the remaining contract. Instead, the landlord has to mitigate its damages, generally by trying to find a replacement tenant to take over the empty space.

But, what about other types of long-term service contracts? Is the service-provider entitled to compensation for both past-due amounts and future contract payments coming due, regardless of whether they can find a “replacement” customer?

This exact issue is presented in three new lawsuits that were filed in mid-December in Davidson County. In the lawsuits, a commercial linen company (i.e. napkins, aprons, bar towels, mats, etc.) sued three Nashville restaurants for breach of the linen rental agreement. In all, the actual past due amount wasn’t that much–instead, the lions share of the requested judgment was for damages for the remaining months of the contract, which this particular agreement. Under this agreement, the provider could recover “60% of the weekly service charge for the unexpired term” as its future damages.

For instance, in the lawsuit against Woolworths on 5th, the restaurant had an actual overdue balance of just $1,430.11. But, after applying the damages clause, the rental company is asking for a total of $77,440.60, which includes 60% of the not-yet-due amounts owed over the 60 month service agreement.

This seems a bit unfair, right?

These types of damages are known as “liquidated damages.” When the actual amount of damages under a contract are uncertain and difficult to calculate, these provisions are agreed to by the parties at the time the contract is signed to provide certainty and establish a method for calculating those damages.

With real estate, it’s really easy to calculate damages —how long was the property vacant after the breach? With longer-term service contracts, it’s more difficult–what expenses and costs did the service provider not incur by not having to provide the linen?

In Tennessee, a liquidated damages clause will be generally be allowed unless the challenging party proves that the provision is really just a penalty and/or designed to punish the breaching party. Tennessee law does not favor penalties, and, if it’s a close call, Tennessee Courts will be inclined to disallow the penalty. Testerman v. Home Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 524 S.W.2d 664 (Tenn.App.1974). In short, a liquidated damages provision should be somewhat reasonable in relation to the possible injury suffered and not unconscionable or excessive.

More recent Tennessee cases tend to favor allowing parties to a contract the freedom to agree to whatever business deal they want, even it’s an awful deal with a fairly onerous damages provision. See Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 101 (Tenn.,1999). “‘The bargain may be an unfortunate one for the delinquent party, [but] it is not the duty of courts of common law to relieve parties from the consequences of their own improvidence.’” Id.

This will be interesting to watch. Sure, damages at 60% of the remaining term sounds really high, but maybe that’s representative of the expected profits in the linen rental industry. If it’s close, a Tennessee court will allow this.

Tennessee law doesn’t require judgment creditors to collect in any particular order. Seriously.

Is a judgment creditor required to exhaust its collection efforts against personal property before executing on real property?

If you asked 100 lawyers over the age of 60 this question, 80 of them would get the answer wrong. And every single one of them would be absolutely positive that they were right.

I’d guess that I have a argument with opposing counsel on this legal issue at least once a month, and it usually ends with them being absolutely certain that I am wrong.

What’s crazy is the answer is simple:

Execution against personalty need not precede execution against realty.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 69.02

So, there you have it.

If you’re wondering, however, whether you should ever start the collection process with efforts to sell real property…well, that’s another blog post entirely.

Tennessee Court of Appeals shows analysis on “reasonable” attorney fees.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued an opinion yesterday in a collection case, which has some really useful analysis on the reasonableness of attorney’s fees. This is an issue near and dear to my heart.

A full copy of the opinion, Tennessee Farmers Cooperative v. Ted Rains,  M201801097COAR3CV, 2019 WL 3229686 (Tenn. App. July 18, 2019), can be found here.

Continue reading “Tennessee Court of Appeals shows analysis on “reasonable” attorney fees.”

Tennessee Courts are Very Generous in Computing Six year Statute of Limitations

I sue borrowers on unpaid debts all the time. I generally calculate the six year statute of limitations in Tennessee on unpaid debts by working backwards from the date of default.

In doing that, I generally look for the first date of default, add 6 years to that date, and there’s your deadline to file the lawsuit.

A recent opinion from the Tennessee Court of Appeals suggests that there’s a more creditor-friendly way to do this.

The case is Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Stacy Lee, et. al., M201801479COAR3CV, 2019 WL 2482423 (Tenn. App. June 13, 2019).

In that case, the debtors had not made a payment on the debt for eight and a half years. The creditor, nevertheless, filed a collections lawsuit, but the creditor only sued for those installment payments that came due in the 6 years prior to the lawsuit (which included a final, fully matured balloon payment). Needless to say, this lawsuit was, essentially, for the entire amount owed (minus, of course, about 12 months of installment/interest payments).

The Court found that each installment missed was an independent cause of action, prompting a new, later statute of limitations deadline for each installment with each passing month. Specifically, the Court wrote:

“As it pertains to an installment note, the law is well settled that the cause of action accrues on each installment when it becomes due, and that the statutory period begins to run from that moment on that installment.” Consumer Credit Union v. Hite, 801 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Here, Deutsche Bank sought missed monthly payments going back six years from the date of the filing of the complaint, which was January 20, 2017. Because a cause of action accrues with respect to each missed installment payment in an installment note, monthly payments that became due and owing since January 20, 2011 are not barred by the statute of limitations.

This is somewhat counter-intuitive, since you’d think a six year old, long defaulted debt would have expired, well, six years from the default. But, it’s not the case. In fact, the only debts that would have expired are the specific installments that came due beyond that six year period.

I’m as pro-creditor as anybody, but this seems like an unfair outcome.

Collect Your Invoices Faster: Include a Due Date

You’d be surprised at how many invoices don’t have specific due dates. Instead, the invoices might say “due upon receipt” or “due within ___ days.”

Why leave the math to your customers? The better practice is to include a clearly labeled “due date” with a date certain by which the payment must be made.

If you really want to get their attention, you could also include a date on which you’ll take the next, clearly defined step.

This may be giving the account debtor a deadline to pay of July 18, and, then, in the next time, telling them that, if that amount isn’t paid, then you’ve been instructed to file a lawsuit on July 19.

Granted, some debtors simply don’t have the money to pay, and no deadline is going to put that money in their account.

But, for those debtors who have the funds to possibly pay but don’t have your debt prioritized, a clear and unmistakable deadline–with a specific threat of the next action–could do the trick.

To Recover Attorney’s Fees in Tennessee, You Have to Be Express and Exact in Your Contract

We’ve talked about this before: Tennessee is a great, creditor-friendly state, but, if you want to recover your attorney’s fees in Tennessee, you’d better have some very specific language in your contract.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals filed an opinion last week as a reminder, at Nyrstar Tennessee Mines-Strawberry Plains, LLC v. Claiborne Hauing, LLC, Tenn. Ct. Apps, No. E2017-00155-COA-R3-CV.

Here is the contract provision the Court considered:

The Customer must pay Nyrstar all costs and expenses incurred by Nyrstar in connection with enforcing its rights against the Customer under an Agreement including legal expenses and other costs incurred in recovering monies owed by the Customer to Nyrstar.

By my read, “all costs and expenses,” along with “including legal expenses,” should be good enough.

The Nystar Court disagreed. That text does not say “including reasonable attorney’s fees.”

As a result, “The provision at issue does not specifically or expressly create a right to ‘fees,’ ‘attorney’s fees,’ or ‘reasonable attorney’s fees.'” Further, ““the term ‘expenses,’ without more, . . . does not include an award of attorney fees.”

As a result, “[t]he language in the contract before us is not sufficient for Nyrstar to be  entitled to recover its attorney’s fees. The provision at issue does not expressly or  specifically create a right for Nyrstar to recover its attorney’s fees.”

So, if you want to recover attorney’s fees in Tennessee, you’d better say exactly that in your contract–that the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its attorney’s fees.