Litigation – Creditors Rights 101

New Court of Appeals Opinion suggests that late-filed Answer may not prevent a default judgment

All the good Nashville lawyers I know are so busy right now. This is a good problem to have, but, nevertheless, it is a problem. There’s simply too much demand right now.

I overheard one local lawyer telling a story about a frantic call he received from a client, who was freaking out because they hadn’t filed an Answer to a lawsuit, and it had been more than 30 days after service.

“Have they filed a Motion for Default yet? If not, then it’s not late.”

I’m sure the lawyer was more tactful in the actual conversation, but the reasoning has some basis in local custom. Often, in Davidson County courts, if a defendant files an Answer before the hearing on a Motion for Default Judgment and pleads a tenable defense, a court will not grant a judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55, under the theory that the justice system prefers that “matters be decided on the merits” not a technicality. (See, generally, Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 491 (Tenn. 2012)).

A recent opinion from the Tennessee Court of Appeals shows that there are risks in waiting to file an Answer.

That case is Conserv Equip. Leasing, LLC v. Schubert Enterprises, LLC, No. E2022-00535-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 1489768 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2023). There, the creditor filed a motion for default, and, a few days later, received a phone call from an attorney who “expected to be retained” by the defendants and asked for a 3 week continuance on the motion hearing. After the hearing was so continued, that defense attorney “fax-filed” an Answer at 3:59pm on the Friday before the Monday morning default hearing, with an original copy filed with the Clerk about 33 minutes before the hearing.

Defendant appeared at the hearing, objecting to the relief and presumably with filed Answer in hand, but the default judgment was nevertheless granted. At the trial court level, Defendants later tried to set aside the ruling on excusable neglect grounds and Tenn. R. C. P. 60.02.

The Court of Appeals noted that “[a]lthough courts construe Rule 60.02 ‘with liberality to afford relief from a default judgment,’ the movant bears the burden of showing ‘why the movant was justified in failing to avoid the … neglect’.” Id. at *2. The Court wrote that “[i]f the court finds that the defaulting party has acted willfully, the judgment cannot be set aside on ‘excusable neglect’ grounds…” and “[m]aking ‘deliberate choices’ amounts to willful conduct. Id.

In the end, the issue was remanded back to the trial court, whose order denying the Rule 60 motion failed to include findings of act and conclusions of law (per Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01). In short, the trial court didn’t provide any explanation for its ruling.

To be clear, though, the Court of Appeals didn’t say the trial court was wrong; instead, it sent it back down for the trial court to provide more explanation for its refusal to set aside the judgment. The most likely outcome, of course, is that the plaintiff will prepare a properly supported proposed order, the judge will sign it, and, then, that order will be appealed.

It’ll be an interesting case to watch, but, procedurally, it’s also a reminder: Don’t delay when dealing with court deadlines.

Tennessee Court of Appeals makes it clear: When a lien is paid, the Lender must pay the release fee (limited exclusions apply)

When a mortgage or judgment gets paid off, the creditor has to release its lien. It’s not only common sense, but it’s a duty imposed by Tennessee statute (see Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-25-101).

It’s an easy process to prepare a Release of Lien and record it with the register of deeds. Also, it’s not particularly expensive. Depending on how many pages the release is, the fee can be as little as $12.00.

Not too onerous for a lender who just got paid in full, right?

Well, not so fast. Ask any of my creditor clients, and they’ll tell you that “paid in full” means “fully paid, including that release fee.” When I get a payoff request on a deed of trust or judgment lien, I generally include a line for the $12.00 release costs.

Not anymore, in light of a December 2022 Tennessee Court of Appeals opinion, Eudaley v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. M202100344COAR3CV, 2022 WL 17751378 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2022). In that case, the mortgage lender got paid in full, recorded the release, and sent a bill to the borrower for $12.00. In response, the borrower filed a class action lawsuit in Davidson County Circuit Court, arguing that, per Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-25-106, “[a]ll costs … for registering a formal release[ ] shall be paid by the holder of the debt secured by the … deed of trust.”

Despite the very clear statutory text, the trial court dismissed the case after finding that federal law allows such fees and preempts the state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but not before providing some useful guidance to other lienholders (who may not have a federal banking regulation to hide behind).

Specifically, the Court wrote that “§ 66-25-106 prohibits holders of debt from seeking reimbursement of costs associated with recording a release of a deed of trust” because “[t]he debt holder’s obligation to record a release only arises if the debt has been paid in full or satisfied, indicating that nothing further is owed to the debt holder.” In affirming the trial court’s dismissal, the opinion makes clear that the lienholder bears those costs and can’t seek reimbursement, but, nevertheless, “that prohibition is preempted by federal law when the debt holder seeking reimbursement is a national bank.”

So, what if you’re not a national bank? Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-25-106 applies, and the creditor must chalk up $12.00 as the cost of getting paid.

What about other sorts of liens, like judgment liens or mechanic’s liens? § 66-25-106 seems to apply to any lienholder, but the judgment creditor may nevertheless have an argument that the release fees are “costs of collection” or allowed court costs/discretionary costs.

Either way, this December 2022 opinion provides pretty compelling authority to support a lender’s decision to simply record the release and write off the $12.00. In a very creditor-friendly state like Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-25-106 is an outlier, but this case is a very good reminder that it exists.

On Lawyer Stress (a/k/a the Post I will send clients when I raise my rates for 2023)

Do you think you might be having a heart attack?

No matter what the actual ailment is. Food poisoning. Anxiety. Indigestion. Insomnia.

When you wake up at 2am, with a racing heart, and a feeling that something isn’t quite right, and get asked “Do you think you might be having a heart attack?”

Well, in that moment, you think one thing. That you might be having a heart attack.

I know this from my own experience, just last month. It was the very early Tuesday morning evening of a very busy week: I had a trial scheduled to start 32 hours later in Memphis and, at the end of the week, a bankruptcy conference in California.

And, in that moment, at 2am, yes, it felt like I was having a heart attack.

Tennessee Courts will not consider substantive challenges to foreign judgments

Where a foreign judgment is based on substantive law that is inconsistent with Tennessee law, will a Tennessee court deny domestication of that judgment in Tennessee? The short answer is “no.” A Tennessee court will only look at whether the judgment is valid in the foreign state and will not consider substantive defenses based on Tennessee law.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals considered this exact issue a few years ago. In that case, the Court was faced with a foreign judgment based on a “confession of judgment” which, under Tennessee law, aren’t valid and are unenforceable. But, because confessions of judgment are valid in the other state, the Court found that a foreign judgment based on a “confession of judgment” was enforceable in Tennessee under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgements Act.

Last week, the Tennessee Court of Appeals that reaffirmed that outcome, in Mantis Funding LLC v. Buy Wholesale Inc., No. M202200204COAR3CV, 2022 WL 17986892, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2022).

In Mantis, the judgment creditor sought to enforce a New York judgment in Davidson County Circuit Court. The judgment debtor objected, but Judge Brothers looked only to whether the New York court was willing to set aside or entertain a challenge to the validity of the underlying judgment. When the New York court denied the debtor’s motion to vacate the judgment, the Tennessee decision was easy: “the New York judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in Tennessee pursuant to the Constitution of the United States of America.” Id. at *1.

The Court of Appeals agreed. Sure, confessions of judgment are void under Tennessee law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-2-101, but “full faith and credit” doesn’t require that the sister state’s judgment be consistent with Tennessee law. Instead, assuming that there are no service or procedural issues, the Tennessee Court will consider only whether the judgment debtor has challenged the foreign judgment and/or the substantive legal issues in the foreign jurisdiction. If not, “the decision is res judicata… [and o]nce decided, these issues cannot be raised in another, later case seeking to enroll the foreign judgment.” Id. at *2.

This is a fairly settled issue in judgment enforcement, but, because a judgment debtor has such limited bases to challenge a foreign judgment, the debtor will nevertheless “throw the kitchen sink” at the creditor. This new opinion reaffirms that such challenges should be denied.

Moving Targets: Determining the Date of Default in a Breach of Contract case isn’t as easy as you’d think

The court cases where attorneys sue clients for unpaid legal fees always get my attention.

As an attorney who bills clients for my work and expects every client to pay every penny, I’m generally curious about what went wrong.

There are unhappy clients. Unhappy attorneys. Bills that are too high, or too late, or for work that made the client unhappy. When attorney-client relationships go bad, there’s always a lesson to be learned.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued an opinion yesterday that has a dozen of these lessons, at Luna Law Group, PLLC v. Richardson M. Roberts, M2021-00699-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2022).

I won’t cover them all, but I will discuss one creditor’s rights high-point: When does a breach of contract occur?

Per this opinion, the six-year statute of limitations at Tenn. Code Ann. 28-3-109(a)(3) is calculated from the “termination of the attorney-client relationship,” and not from the date of the unpaid individual invoices.

The Court wrote that contracts can be “severable” or “entire,” with the relevant statute of limitation depending on the nature of the contract. Since the work at issue related to the same general engagement and the attorney’s work “would be continuously rendered over a period of time,” then, the attorney’s work was “entire.” As a result, “the statute of limitations begins to run only on the completion of such legal services” (or upon termination of the attorney’s work).

Here, the attorney filed the lawsuit (barely) within 6 years from the termination, but only after $136,283 in unpaid invoices had accumulated in the preceding 10 months (with many or most of those invoices coming due and unpaid longer than 6 years prior).

Honestly, I’d have thought that the statute would have run on some of those early invoices, but that the creditor would have had valid claims on the invoices that had gone into default within 6 years. Under this case, I would have been wrong.

Breaches, defaults, and calculating the statute of limitations isn’t as easy as you’d think. Remember this 2019 post about a debtor who didn’t make a payment for 8.5 years, but the Court found that each installment missed was an independent cause of action, resulting in a new, later statute of limitations for each new installment? I was also wrong about that one, because (as I wrote back then) “you’d think a six year old, long defaulted debt would have expired, well, six years from the default.”

To refresh your memory, debtor entered into a mortgage (final maturity date: February 1, 2021), and defaulted in 2008, but bank waited until 2016 to declare default and until 2017 to file the lawsuit.

Using the reasoning of this new case, could the Bank simply have argued that: (i) the 15 year mortgage is one, continuous debt; (ii) thus, the individual installment payments are payments on that debt and not severable obligations; (iii) and, as a result, the real statute of limitations on the failure to pay the 2008 installment payments didn’t start to run until the final maturity date on February 1, 2021?

The answer is, most likely, that the attorney’s future performance of services is indefinite and any invoices are merely progress billings toward that larger “entire” engagement, which is unlike a bank debt, which has definite and exact terms for the repayment. Having said that, though, a smart lawyer will have ample case citations to argue either direction.

In the end, I have two take-aways: (a) determining the date of breach is harder than you’d think; and (b) when in doubt, file your lawsuit sooner, rather than later.

Service of Process: Just Like in Hollywood (Part 2)

It’s a strange day when legal procedural issues get top billing on the Today Show…

As you may have seen, Jason Sudeikis served his ex-Olivia Wilde with legal papers while she was, literally, on a public stage talking about her upcoming movie. The photos from the event show her, in real time, opening the packet and reading the custody papers. On stage.

It’s news-worthy because it seems like such a jerk thing to do, especially given the public persona of Sudeikis, who is famous for playing the nicest character on modern TV and, generally, regarded as a nice person in real life.

Seriously, Ted Lasso isn’t just nice, but inspirationally nice. I can’t count the number of showy LinkedIn posts talking about life lessons people have learned from Ted. One review called the show a “warm hug of nice.”

But, this? This seems like a big-time jerk move.

I’ve written about this frequently: Service of process can be the hardest part of litigation, and a party may be forced to go to great lengths to get somebody personally served with legal papers. It may be a little too “on the nose” to cite examples from Hollywood, but this sequence from Pineapple Express is hilarious and procedurally accurate. It’s also a huge deal: Ineffective service of process can ruin your entire lawsuit.

Personally, in trying serve an evasive defendant, I’ve researched social media, court dockets, or anything else that will help me locate where and when the defendant may be. My process server has shown up holding a bouquet of flowers, an empty cardboard box, and waited at the end of a bike race, looking for Racer # 3433 at the finish line.

So, did Sudeikis do something wrong? It depends. Was Olivia Wilde evading service, requiring them to go to this extra mile to “catch” her? We don’t know that.

But, we do know this: This move is inflammatory and is going to make this litigation more difficult. As lawyers, we are faced with all sorts of “allowed” procedural tactics that sound great on paper, but that can also skew litigation into scorched earth territories in real life. Part of a good lawyer’s job is to talk clients out of those tactics and focus on the bigger picture.

Here, Sudeikis has already disavowed the action, saying that neither he nor his lawyer approved this rogue decision by the process server.

But, looking at the big picture, the damage may already be done. This custody battle just got a lot more contentious. And, honestly, it’s going to be weird watching Ted Lasso manage his own divorce and custody issues knowing what I know about this messy real-life drama.

New Tennessee Court of Appeals Resolves Ten-Year Old Question about Post-Judgment Interest Rate

For nearly a decade, I’ve been writing about the Tennessee post-judgment interest statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121, which was amended in 2012 to change from the long-standing fixed rate of 10% to a variable rate that changes every 6 months.

I say “writing,” but others may say “complaining.” They’d probably cite this post: What I Don’t Like About the New Post-Judgment Interest Rate Statute In Tennessee (Everything).

My initial concern was one that many Tennessee lawyers shared: Because the interest rate is subject to change every six months, will the applicable rate on an existing judgment also change every six months?

Nobody knew. Not attorneys. Not court clerks. Not even the trial court judges.

In a very helpful comment to this 2020 post about the issue, Tennessee attorney Michelle Reynolds provided the best answer I’d seen (and one that I’ve since argued):

From the TNCourts.gov website: “Beginning July 1, 2012, any judgment entered will have the interest set at two percent below the formula rate published by the Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions as set in Public Chapter 1043. The rate does not fluctuate and remains in effect when judgment is entered.”

Of course, that’s not a case or a statute. It’s an “introductory paragraph on the Administrative Office of the Courts website.”

In an opinion issued last night, however, we have our answer!

In the case (Laura Coffey v. David L. Coffey, No. E2021-00433-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2022), the Tennessee Court of Appeals notes this long-standing confusion and then immediately dispels it.

In its analysis, the Court notes that the rate to be applied under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121(a) is clear and unambiguous (it’s math), and it’s the entirely separate provision at Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121(b) that introduces fluctuations in the general rate. Noting the clarity in (a), the Court finds that (b) does not create ambiguity as to existing judgments.

Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121(a), the Court writes, the “applicable post-judgment interest rate does not fluctuate when applied to a particular judgment; instead, it remains the same for the entire period of time following entry of the judgment…until the judgment is paid.”

It’s always a great day when an unresolved issue gets clarity. Sometimes I make a joke that only “law nerds” will appreciate a legal development like this; for this one, though, I think all Tennessee lawyers will benefit from this opinion.

Tennessee Judgments Always Incur Post-Judgment Interest

A good rule of thumb for prevailing parties in litigation is this: If you want something, be sure to include that in the court order.

Well, duh. The Judge can’t give it to you if it’s not expressly written in the order.

A recent opinion from the Tennessee Court of Appeals (Hartigan v. Brush, No. E202001442COAR3CV, 2021 WL 4983075 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2021)), however, makes clear that post-judgment interest applies on all monetary judgments in Tennessee, no matter if the order expressly says so.

There, the Court noted that, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-122, “Interest shall be computed on every judgment…,” and, as a result, post-judgment interest is “mandatory.”

It’s an issue that’s unlikely to come up often, partially because every prevailing party generally includes an express grant in their judgment. But, when the order doesn’t expressly say it, have this recent case ready to go.

Ukraine Fundraising: I raised $1,950 for World Central Kitchen

I’ll skip to the Tl;dr part: On March 10, I donated all of my 6.5 billable hours to support Ukraine and, at $300.00 an hour, I raised $1,950.00 for World Central Kitchen’s refugee relief efforts.

In the grand scheme of things, it’s not much, but, to my little firm, a day’s worth of revenues is a lot.

This has been a law firm fund-raising concept that I’ve pondered for a while.

With the demands and time constraints that so many lawyers face, it’s hard to make time to volunteer at Legal Aid. But, if lawyers are already sitting at our desks, why not cut out the transit time and simply donate an hour (or more) of billable time per month to a good cause?

Of course, this grand idea works best at a big firm, where one hour a month is just a blip on an individual lawyer’s hourly billables report but, at the same time, results a substantial amount of money each month when you’ve got 40-50 lawyers participating.

Get a few law firms doing this instead of the standard “sponsor a table at a dinner” contribution, and you’re talking real money going to local charities.

So, to put my money where my mouth is, I’ll continue to do this each month, supporting different charitable causes by direct cash payments representing a billable hour.

Next month, I will donate time on April 13 to support the International Rescue Committee’s work helping Syrian refugees. I’m open to suggestions for the month after that.

And, in the interim, I promise to get back to law blogging. Thanks for your support.

Foo Fighters’ Nashville Lawsuit provides important lesson on allocating risks in contracts

When COVID first hit, lawyers talked about how future contracts would evolve to anticipate the special challenges presented by a global pandemic.

Now, 19 months in, a new Davidson County Chancery lawsuit filed on behalf of the Foo Fighters shows that–even with all the planning in the world–COVID is still disrupting the best laid plans.

The plaintiff (the touring company that books gigs for the band) alleges that defendant hired the Foo Fighters to perform at an August 13, 2021 corporate event for payroll processing company ADP. The parties entered entered into a April 5, 2021 written agreement. Per the contract, the band would receive $3,000,000 for the performance, with half paid when the contract was signed, and the other half paid at (or before) the event.

But this contract was updated to take into account all the lessons learned during a global pandemic.

Per Paragraph 10 of the Complaint, if the defendant defaults or cancels the performance for any reason, the band would receive the full performance payment (regardless of whether the band actually plays the show).

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, it’s clear that concerns about COVID played a large role in the negotiations. In fact, the parties included a section called “COVID CANCELLATION,” which–as you’d guess–allocated the risk of a forced cancellation due to the pandemic.

And, boy-oh-boy, was that risk apportioned squarely onto the plaintiff:

In short, if the contracted for event were to be deemed unsafe and impossible due to the resurgence of COVID, this provision says that it does not matter. The band, in their “sole reasonable discretion,” can terminate the obligation and refuse to perform…and still get paid.

Was COVID a “force majuere” event? The band says that they expressly removed the reference to COVID in that paragraph, and further allege this:

There’s a bit more to the story, but, in short, COVID didn’t go away, and this August 2021 event at Mile High Stadium in Denver became less and less of a good idea for the ADP corporate event.

They discussed limited capacity, the band offered to do an exclusive live-stream concert, but, on August 4, 2021 (9 days before the event), the defendant decided to cancel the event. The lawsuit points out that “there was no local, state, or other governmental restriction that required the cancellation of the Event” and, helpfully, points out a number of other large concerts and events that happened that weekend in or near Denver.

The Foo Fighters have sued for the $1,500,000 owed under the Agreement. (And I tend to agree with their analysis of the contract.)

It’s an interesting case. On the most superficial level, it shows that, no matter how hard you try, it’s hard to contract around the unexpected.

In April 2021, my own family was so exuberant about the vaccines and a COVID-free summer (and fall) that we surprised our kids with shockingly expensive Jonas Brothers tickets to celebrate the end of the pandemic. In April, my wife and I believed we had weathered the storm and that a sold out concert in September 2021 was a totally safe and reasonable reward for our kids. We went, but we were terrified taking our vaccinated kids to the show.

I have to wonder if the defendants, here, suffered from a similar bit of vaccine optimism.

Nevertheless, the Foo Fighters’ lawyers did not share that optimism; or, if they did, they included sufficient terms in the contract to assign the burden of any risk squarely on the other party.

From what I’ve seen of it, it’s a good contract. Who knew we’d be learning some lessons about contract law from the Foo Fighters?