January 2019 – Creditors Rights 101

May the Lawsuit Filed Against You be an Interpleader Complaint

Today’s post is just a quick follow-up to one from a few years ago.

That post, titled Interpleaders: The Only Time People Like to Hear from Me, discussed what an interpleader action is, why a bank/creditor would file an interpleader, and, most importantly, why it’s good news to receive one.

With it being the start of the year, a lot of banks and law firms are dealing with escrow and trust account balances, and trying to resolve those balances (i.e. pay the funds out). If those funds relate to a foreclosure and the foreclosing bank or trustee isn’t sure who is the proper party to send them to, they’ll probably file a Complaint in Interpleader.

So, to those of you who have had property foreclosed on in 2018 and now the bank has filed a lawsuit, there’s a chance that the lawsuit is good news.

A small chance, but there’s always hope.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-108 is the Scariest Statute I’ve Seen in a While (and I can’t wait to use it)

On May 21, 2018, the Legislature enacted a law related to real property lien disputes with some real teeth. (When I say “teeth,” I’m picturing the movie poster for Jaws.)

That statute is Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-108.

The law provides that, if a real property owner prevails in challenging a lien, the owner “shall recover” all of the following:

The owner’s reasonable attorney’s fees; AND
Reasonable costs incurred by the owner to challenge the validity of the lien; AND
Liquidated damages in an amount equal to ten percent (10%) of the fair market value of the property not to exceed one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); AND
Any actual damages incurred by the owner.

What’s significant about this statute is all the punishments it awards a party losing a lien dispute. It creates a statutory basis for attorneys fees (remember, Tennessee is an “American Rule” state) and also creates a statutory basis for pretty hefty liquidated damages (remember, Tennessee courts don’t favor liquidated damages provisions).

And, in case that’s not enough, don’t overlook that this statute imposes these double penalties on a “strict liability” basis, meaning that there needs to be no showing of bad faith. Instead, all that the property owner needs to do is: (1) prevail; and (2) ask for all these damages.

So, if you’re the property owner, you’ll love this statute. If you’re a contractor or represent lien claimants, I suspect you’re going to think twice (and maybe more) about this statute every time you file a lien claim.

In Order to Be Granted Summary Judgment on a Claim, a Party Must File a Motion

In Chancery Court litigation, when I’m the movant on a motion for summary judgment, I sometimes describe my potential outcomes as “Win” or “Not Win.”

In short, I’m either going to win my case on summary grounds or not, but, as the moving party, I’m not going to lose the case, unless the other side files their own “counter” motion seeking summary judgment.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued an opinion yesterday that confirms this, at Adrian Lynn McWilliams, et. al. v. Brenda Vaughn, et. al. (No. E2017-01942-COA-R3-CV, Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2019).

In that opinion, the Court wrote that, when faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, “a court must rule independently on each motion and determine, with regard to each motion, whether disputes of material fact with regard to that motion exist.” Savage v. City of Memphis, 464 S.W.3d 326, 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (citing CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Trost, 333 S.W.3d 73, 82 (Tenn. 2010)). Further, “the denial of one party’s motion for summary judgment does not necessarily imply that the other party’s motion should be granted.” Id. Rather, when considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must determine whether each party is “independently entitled to summary judgment.” Id.

To be clear, where one party’s motion for summary judgment is denied does not necessarily mean that the other party is entitled to prevail, even if they filed their own motion. Id. That’s because there are all kinds of factors that go into whether to grant or deny a summary judgment motion.

But, the Court went on to note, where the other side doesn’t file a competing motion, that other, non-moving party is definitely not entitled to an award of summary judgment. Id. In order to be granted summary judgment, you have to be a “moving” party.

So, in the end, keep this opinion handy when you’re preparing for a summary judgment hearing, where the opposing party doesn’t file its own motion. There, it’s a “Win/Not Win” situation for you.

Start 2019 Right: Apply to be a Lawyer Mentor

With the new year, I’ve committed to serving the community more in 2019 than ever before.

To that end, I’ve signed up to mentor 7 high school students via the tnAchieves program, I’m coaching (maybe) a Mock Trial team at one of Nashville’s inner city high schools this spring, and, of course, I’m still going to visit Legal Aid regularly and continuing my service at The Village Chapel.

If you’re looking for an opportunity to get more engaged, I really recommend the Tennessee Bar Association’s Mentoring Program. It’s not too big of a time commitment and, trust me, you’ll make a lifelong friend in the process.

And, because we’re lawyers, the way we interact, foster relationships, and model civility in the bar with each other matters.

If you’ve got a few years under your belt (and, don’t worry, any experience matters and they’ll place you with an appropriate mentee), you’re needed.

Apply here.

Tennessee Post-Judgment Interest Rate at All-Time Modern High

Once upon a time, computing post judgment interest was really, really easy. But, as you’ll recall from my post in February 2013, Tennessee switched from a flat-rate of 10% to a variable rate under the (then) new version of Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121.

Under that statute, the post judgment interest rate is subject to increase every six months. And, lately, it’s been steadily going up, every six months.

On January 1, 2019, it went up again, to 7.45%.

This is the highest that it’s been, since the statute changed.

Tennessee Supreme Court Changes Rule 4 on Service of Process

The Tennessee Supreme Court has issued four orders adopting amendments to various rules of procedure that will go into effect on July 1, subject to approval from the Tennessee General Assembly.

These include changes to the rules of criminal procedure and evidence, but, today, I’m going to talk about how Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4 has changed. Here is a link to the proposed changes. This includes changes to service of process, which is a critical step in any litigation.

On this issue, it’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.04 that is amended, where a plaintiff tries to serve a defendant via certified mail. Specifically, the amendments add a provision that allows for valid service where a defendant “refuse[s] to accept delivery” of the certified mail, as long as the record contains:

a return receipt stating that the addressee or the addressee’s agent refused to accept delivery, which is deemed to be personal acceptance by the defendant pursuant to Rule 4.04(11)

The Advisory Commission Comments provide a helpful warning for these situations. They state that “the Postal Service’s notation that a registered or certified letter is ‘unclaimed’ is no longer sufficient, by itself, to prove that service was ‘refused.’ ”

This comment clearly reminds plaintiffs to make sure that the return receipt states “refused” and not “unclaimed.” This distinction is important, since so many defendants simply never go to the post office to pick up their certified mail, because they assume it’s just a lawsuit, demand letter, or some other collection correspondence. This Comment makes clear that a lazy defendant does not submit itself to personal jurisdiction.

Remember, Rule 60 Motions Must be Filed Within One Year

This new opinion from the Tennessee Court of Appeals sets up a nightmare scenario for a prevailing party.

In that case (Reliant Bank v. Kelly D. Bush, No. M2018-00510-COA-R3-CV, Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018), the Bank won a post-foreclosure deficiency judgment in 2014, after competing experts testified about the fair market value of the property under Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-118. The former homeowners appealed the ruling, which was affirmed in 2016, and remanded. But, on remand, a new Chancery Court Judge was on the bench, and the new Chancellor had a different analysis and partially aside the judgment under Rule 60.02.

On the second appeal, the Judgment was upheld, but talk about snatching victory from the jaws of defeat (or vice versa).

Aside from being a great lesson about the uncertainty and risks of litigation, the 2018 opinion provides some good reminders about Rule 60.02. The Court noted, in part, the following:

Relief under Rule 60.02 is “an exceptional remedy.” Nails v. Aetna Ins. Co., 834
S.W.2d 289, 294 (Tenn. 1992). The rule is intended “to alleviate the effect of an
oppressive or onerous final judgment.” Spence v. Helton, No. M2005-02527-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1202407, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2007). It “acts as an escape valve from possible inequity that might otherwise arise from the unrelenting imposition of the principal of finality embedded in our procedural rules.” Thompson v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 798 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tenn. 1990). The movant has the burden of proving the grounds for relief. Spence, 2007 WL 1202407 at *3.

Under Rule 60.02(1), the court may set aside a final judgment for reasons of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Under Rule 60.02(2), additional reasons for a court to set aside a final judgment are “fraud … misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.” Id. But motions based on Rule 60.02(1) or (2) must be filed within a reasonable time, not more than one year after the order was entered. Id.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the new Motion to be untimely.

Because the motion was untimely, the chancery court should not have entertained it. See Furlough v. Spherion Atl. Workforce, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 114, 131 (Tenn. 2013) (concluding that “relief [wa]s not available under Rule 60.02(1)” because the petition seeking relief “was not timely filed”); cf. Rogers v. Estate of Russell, 50 S.W.3d 441, 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“[M]otions under Rule 60.02(1) and (2) must be filed both within a reasonable time and within one year after the judgment or order was entered.”).