Category: Litigation

Multiple Bankruptcy Filings: Debtors are Ineligible for New Discharges for 8 Years Between Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases

How quickly can an individual who has received a Chapter 7 discharge obtain a new Chapter 7 discharge?

The answer is in 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(8), which provides that the Bankruptcy Court shall grant a discharge, unless:

(8) the debtor has been granted a discharge under this section, under section 1141 of this title, or under section 14, 371, or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced within 8 years before the date of the filing of the petition;

So, the quick answer is that you count out 8 years from the date that the individual filed the first case in which he or she received a Discharge. Note: You don’t count the 8 years from the last discharge, but, instead, from the date that the earlier case was filed.

This is why you see what some people refer to as “Chapter 20” bankruptcy cases, in which a debtor receives a discharge in Chapter 7 and then immediately (or soon thereafter) files a subsequent Chapter 13 case. The debtor doesn’t get a discharge in the Chapter 13, but can get the other benefits of Chapter 13, like stretching out the amortization of a debt that was reaffirmed in Chapter 7 or obtaining a stay from collection on liens or reaffirmed debts.

This is a change from earlier law, which set the time period between discharges using a 6 year period.

 

Another side issue to consider: under 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(f)(1), the debtor in a subsequent Chapter 13 will not receive a discharge in that Chapter 13 if he or she received a discharge under 7 or 11 in a case filed under 7 or 11 during the 4 year period preceding the Chapter 13 filing.

Ex-Tennessee Titan Sued by Former Landlords for Property Damage

Real Estate is hot in Nashville. That’s not a news flash. In fact, unless you were burned in the economic downtown, you’ve probably always thought that real estate is a safe investment, either has an appreciating asset or as an income producing asset.

With high-end real estate, the income possibilities in this current market are endless. Short term rentals to tourists on AirBNB. Long term leases to health care executives. Leases to country music stars or professional athletes.

Well, one Nashville couple has learned the hard way that leases to star football players may require a greater security deposit.

In a lawsuit filed against former Tennessee Titan running back Zach Brown, a landlord for rental property has sued in Nashville’s Davidson Chancery Court (Rental Lawsuit), alleging failure to pay rent. After they were awarded a judgment in a prior detainer action, they were surprised to find the property in terrible condition, the lawsuit alleges.

The $59,286.85 in damages alleged includes claims of: animal teeth marks on staircases and doors; stains on carpet; “damage to the walls by what appears to be repeated throws of footballs and darts;” holes in the wall; and door frame damage “from where it appears a locked door was forced open.”

These are just allegations, but, long story short, a property owner opens the door to deterioration and damage when he or she rents to a stranger. There’s no such thing as easy money, and the landlord / tenant model has its fair share of risks.

 

 

 

The Doctrine of Prior Suit Pending is What it Sounds Like

Sometimes, legal concepts have names that make no sense. “Qui Tam” Actions. “Quiet Title” Complaints. “Res Judicata.” “Equitable Subrogation.”

In other cases, the concepts have straight-forward names. Like “prior suit pending,” which is a concept that I’ve never specifically researched, but always felt like I understood–based solely on its name.

Yesterday, the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Rafia Khan v. Regions Bank, et. al., No. E2015-01891-COA-R3-CV, May 25, 2016,  that explains the elements of this concept.

And, you’ll be pleased to know, it’s as simple as it sounds: “The doctrine of prior suit pending is well-established in Tennessee law and provides that a lawsuit is subject to dismissal where a prior lawsuit involves the same parties and subject matter.” See West v. Vought Aircraft Indus., Inc., 256 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Tenn. 2008).

There are four elements:

  1. the lawsuits must involve identical subject matter;
  2. the lawsuits must be between the same parties;
  3. the former lawsuit must be pending in a court having subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute; and
  4. the former lawsuit must be pending in a court having personal jurisdiction over the parties.

When considering whether the subject matter is the same, the Court wrote, this analysis “applies not only to issues actually raised in the first suit, but also to issues that could have been raised regarding the same subject matter.”

In short, the defense is as simple as it sounds: Where a prior lawsuit exists on the same factual and legal issues, a litigant may be able to dismiss any subsequent lawsuit on those same issues (or closely related issues that could have been raised).

Keep in mind, however, that lawyers tend to give simple concepts complex names, but this one must have just slipped past.

Why Do Tennessee Court Clerks Hold Garnished Funds for Twenty Days?

You’ve got your judgment. You’ve waited for the appeal period to expire. You’ve issued your garnishment. And, finally, the Clerk has some money for you. But, they say they have to hold it for 20 days. 20 more days!?!

Why? Where does this 20 day period come from? It’s on the garnishment forms, I know, but what’s the basis for holding the funds under the Rules of Procedure or under Tennessee statutes?

The answer is Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-407, which allows a judgment debtor to file a motion to quash a garnishment, in order to assert certain exemption rights, within twenty (20) days from the levy.

Wait a second, you might be thinking. What about Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-114, which says that “a claim for exemption filed after the judgment has become final will have no effect as to an execution which is issued prior to the date the claim for exemption is filed, and as to such preexisting execution the claim for exemption shall be deemed waived.”

In layman’s terms: If you don’t claim the exemption before the garnishment is issued, then it’s waived. Why on earth, then, a procedure exist to assert a claim that was waived?

Here’s how this works: Tennessee statutes allow some assets to be absolutely exempt. These assets include: social security benefits; certain government pensions; certain health care aids; unemployment and veterans benefits; and certain insurance benefits. (See Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-404 for a list.)

These assets are “untouchable,” and, as a result, the motion to quash procedure exists to make sure that the garnishment doesn’t catch those specific items.

As a practical matter, a judgment debtor may use this time period to file a Slow Pay Motion or file a Bankruptcy, but, under Tennessee law, they’ve actually got a very limited basis to attack your garnishment during the 20 days. If it’s not one of those listed exemptions, you’ll probably get your money…in twenty days.

15 Day Continuance Limit on Detainer Actions

A few weeks ago, I talked about detainer warrants and how fast a landlord can get an eviction hearing set (a minimum of six days from service of process).

A caveat, however, is that many courts will allow continuances, especially when a plaintiff has set a hearing on such short notice. Some courts, like Davidson County, have Local Rules that expressly allow some continuances.

But, the ability to get a continuance in detainer actions isn’t absolute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-118 provides that the “general sessions judge may, at the request of either party, and on good reason being assigned, postpone the trial to any time not exceeding fifteen (15) days.”

In eviction actions, a landlord isn’t getting paid, so the delay costs the landlord both time and money.

Detainer Warrants: When can I get them Out?

Tennessee’s General Sessions Courts provide the fastest justice in the state. There, a plaintiff can file a lawsuit and, potentially, have a judgment in as early as 2-3 weeks.

No plaintiffs, however, are as eager to get to court than landlords. A common question I get is: What is the quickest court date a landlord can get?

The answer is in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-117, which provides: “The officer serving the warrant shall notify the defendant of the time and place of trial, the time not to be less than six (6) days from the date of service.”

So, in order to have a valid eviction lawsuit, you have to provide–at a minimum–six days notice from the date of service of process.

Note:  This timeline is for commercial property evictions. Residential evictions are governed by the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act , and that is it’s own blog post.

 

 

Tennessee Detainer Actions: Not Just for Tenants and Landlords

What if you own real property, but someone else has possession of the property, and you want them gone? You evict them. But, as you’ll see under Tennessee statutes, they don’t call it an “eviction” lawsuit; they call it a “detainer” lawsuit.

The statute in Tennessee is Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-104, titled “Unlawful Detainer.” That statute provides:

“Unlawful detainer is where the defendant enters by contract, either as tenant or as assignee of a tenant, or as personal representative of a tenant, or as subtenant, or by collusion with a tenant, and, in either case, willfully and without force, holds over the possession from the landlord, or the assignee of the remainder or reversion.”

These detainer actions are generally brought in general sessions court, where, as I’ve noted before, you can exceed the $25,000 jurisdictional limit. Also, even though general sessions appeals are very easy on most matters, they are complicated and expensive in general sessions court.

So, if you’re a landlord, you’re probably reading that statute and thinking it’s exactly what you need, right? But, what about if you’ve purchased the property, either by a typical sale or a foreclosure? In that case, you’re not a landlord, and the defendant isn’t entering by contract (i.e. lease). Does a different statute apply?

No, said the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Federal National Mortgage Association v. Danny O. Daniels, W2015-00999-COA-R3-CV (Dec. 21, 2015).  There, the Court noted that the Deed of Trust will create “a landlord/tenant relationship … between the foreclosure sale purchaser and the mortgagor in possession of the property,” and, as a result, “constructive possession is conferred on the foreclosure sale purchaser upon the passing of title; that constructive possession provides the basis for maintaining the unlawful detainer.”

In such a case, a plaintiff must prove: (1) its constructive possession of the property (i.e. ownership of the property); and (2) its loss of possession by the other party’s act of unlawful detainer.

In short, the detainer statutes in Tennessee aren’t well crafted. Sometimes they reference landlords and tenants; sometimes they don’t. Courts have a tendency to construe statutes as written and to assume that the legislature means what it says when it uses specific words. That’s bad news for the foreclosure sale purchaser, who isn’t a landlord and who isn’t dealing with a tenant.

Here, however, it’s clear that the legislature should have proofread the statutes a few more times. Fortunately, Tennessee courts have applied the statutes in a broader sense.

 

Insufficient Service of Process Arguments May be Recognized Under Tennessee Law

Note: This post contains updated information after its original posting date.

When it comes to creditor rights deficiency lawsuits, it’s rare that I see something new.

Most defendants’ Answers to my lawsuits to collect unpaid debts follow the same pattern: They admit the jurisdictional/party paragraphs, claim they lack sufficient information on the amount of the debt, and then deny all paragraphs alleging default and asking for a judgment.

Recently, however, I saw a creative argument that, honestly, freaked me out.

It was an Answer that contained the following “Affirmative Defense:”

Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed due to insufficient service of process for failure to include required information on the Return of Service. The Return on Service of Summons for both Defendants fails to include the process server’s name and/or address as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.01(2). See Lasher v. Robertson, No. 03A01-9402-CV-00075, 1994 WL 579972, *2-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1994).

In that Lasher opinion, the Court of Appeals was faced with a return on a Summons that “contained only the date and the unreadable signature of the process server.” 

Two years later, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging insufficient service of process of the lawsuit. That motion was granted.

Citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01, the Court of Appeals agreed.

For starters, “The process server must be identified by name and address on the return.” See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(2).   Further, “The person serving the summons shall promptly make proof of service to the court and shall identify the person served and shall describe the manner of service.” See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(1).

Applying those rules, the Court of Appeals wrote:

The Plaintiff’s process server met none of the requirements contained in Rule 4.01(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The process server was not identified by name and address on either the return of service or on the affidavit; he did not promptly and within the time during which the person served must respond, make proof of service to the Court; he did not identify the person served nor describe the manner of service. Even considering the very untimely filed affidavit of Daniel C. Derrick, the requirements of Rule 4.03(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure still were not met. Indeed, the record is totally void of the location of Defendant Robertson’s residence. Neither Defendant filed an answer and there is no indication in the record before us of any documents being served upon either Defendant during the pendency of the proceedings in the lower Court.

Id. at *3.

Given the custom and practice regarding service of process Tennessee handling consumer and commercial collection lawsuits, this case and analysis can have broad reaching impact.

In the end, there’s a lesson here: (1) Include the process server’s name and address on the Summons; and (2) When in doubt, include the method, manner, and details of the service on your Summonses.

Ineffective Service of Process Will Not Toll the Statute of Limitations in Tennessee: Act Fast in Obtaining (or Correcting) Service

Earlier this year, I wrote a blog post explaining that, under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, just because you filed a timely lawsuit, doesn’t mean that you don’t have statute of limitations issues–you have to also accomplish prompt and timely service of process.

Recently, the Tennessee Court Appeals re-visited that issue in Kimberly Urban v. Robin Nichols, and it came to the same conclusion. In the Urban case, the Plaintiff filed the lawsuit within the one year statute of limitations, but the Plaintiff delayed in obtaining valid service of process and, worse, delayed in correcting her defective efforts to obtain service. The Court found that the ineffective service, followed by the long delay in correcting the service, failed to prevent the statute of limitations from expiring. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the lawsuit.

But, basically, that’s the same law as the blog post from April, right? Yes, but what I found interesting about this new case is that, if the Plaintiff had been diligent about correcting the ineffective service of process, the Court would have cut her some slack.

In fact, the Court said she could have amended her Complaint under Rule 15 to correct the defective name of one of the defendants or she could have issued new summons. If she had made any of these corrective efforts in a timely fashion, the Court suggests, the case would not have been dismissed on the technicalities, since Tennessee law and policy favor litigants to amend their pleadings to have disputes resolved on the merits.

So, the moral of the story may be: If you make a technical error, act fast in getting it fixed or at least brought before the Court.

Forum Selection Clauses Will be Upheld by Tennessee Courts

You don’t need a law degree to know this: The tricky stuff in a contract is always in the fine print, at the end of the contract.

For instance, most good contracts will invariably include a forum selection clause. This is generally a line at the end of the “Miscellaneous” paragraph that says something like: the parties to the contract agree that any action or proceeding arising under or related to this agreement shall be filed only in the United States District Court or the state courts in Nashville, Tennessee.

Of course, forum selection clauses don’t always say “Nashville,” but they do generally list the forum in a location that is: (1) convenient to the party preparing the contract; and (2) inconvenient for the other party. It makes sense, the contract drafter says, because that company doesn’t want to open itself to lawsuits all over the country. Presented with these “take it or leave it” terms, the other party often doesn’t object, no matter how burdensome the forum would be, because a party doesn’t generally sign a contract anticipating a default.

Unless, you know, they have a lawyer review the contract and warn you about the doomsday scenario. In Tennessee, these provisions are generally enforceable, as noted in a recent Court of Appeals opinion, The Cohn Law Firm v. YP Southeast Advertising & Publishing, LLC. In that case, a Memphis-based law firm filed suit against the Yellow Pages in Memphis; in response, the Yellow Pages moved to dismiss, citing page 3, paragraph 18 (titled “Miscellaneous”) of the contract, stating that all lawsuits must be filed in Georgia. The lower court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, and the appellate court agreed.

That Court wrote that: “Generally, a forum selection clause is enforceable and binding on the parties entering the contract. Lamb v. MegaFlight, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). A forum selection clause will be upheld if it is fair and reasonable in light of all the circumstances surrounding its origin and application. Id. (citing Dyersburg Mach. Works, Inc. v. Rentenbach Eng’g Co., 650 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. 1983)). A party seeking to invalidate a forum selection clause must prove that the clause resulted from misrepresentation, duress, abuse of economic power, or other unconscionable means. Id.”

The Court further wrote: “Tennessee law is clear that the party challenging the enforcement of the forum selection clause “should bear a heavy burden of proof.” Chaffin v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 1999 WL 188295, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1999).

The Plaintiffs argued that the contract was an “adhesion” contract, i.e. a boilerplate provision that wasn’t discussed or contemplated, and the Court ultimately rejected this, since the forum selection clause wasn’t patently unfair and had a reasonable basis.

I estimate that most contracts have these provisions in them; if they don’t, they should. A good lawyer will always consider the “worst case” scenario, even at the front end of the deal. In doing that, no lawyer worth his billable hour rate will overlook the impact of a forum selection clause.